Sex, gender, and sexuality are very common words used in our current society. However, we intertwine the meaning of each word and mistakenly use each one of them. In other words, we tend to think they are all the same. But, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick clarifies this in her book. Sex is a biological differentiation between individuals who have the chromosomes XX and those who have the XY chromosome and their respective genital organs (Sedgwick 2570).  So what we call sex is just “chromosomal sex.” On the other hand, gender is a socially constructed (Sedgwick 2751). It is a set of cultural beliefs that we stick to chromosomal sex. Meanwhile, sexuality has to do with identification, genital sensations, and practice that we do for pleasure and/or reproduction (Sedgwick 2752). Society has tough us that female/male gender formation over sex are opposites but this is not actually true. The only opposite relationship among these terms is between sex and sexuality.

Due to our misuse of the terms, the relationship between “sex” and “gender” is misinterpreted. There is not opposite relation between chromosomal sex and gender. To be more accurate, chromosomal sex is the raw material in which gender is constructed. As Sedgwick explains, gender elaborates a concept of contradiction between the individuals with XX chromosomes and XY chromosomes. But although they are distinctive, there are no characteristics that suggest a contradiction. The belief that male and female are opposites only exist within the confines of t gender concept and it is used to control the power socioeconomic status of individuals in society. For instance, Sedgwick says, “the purpose of that strategy has been to gain analytic and critical leverage on the female-disadvantaging social arrangements that prevail in a given time in a given society.” In other words, male and female are not opposites. It is just a belief within gender to control female’s status in society. With this said, let’s look at the only contradictive relationship stated by Sedgwick.

Sexuality is the very opposite of what we call chromosomal sex. Sedgwick states that sexuality “could occupy, instead, even more than ‘gender’ the polar of the relational….” (2472). Our species, like most species in this planet, come in two sexes. Sex allows the reproduction of the species. On the other hand, sexuality has to do with how we experiences pleasure through genital formation with whom we decided to do this with. While sex is the most predetermined, physically rooted, and innate while sexuality is the most aleatory, symbolically infused, and learned (Sedgwick 2472). In addition, there are only two sexes and it is already predetermined. Nevertheless, sexuality is a matter of choice and identity, and there are many different kinds of sexuality. Now let’s look at the relationship between gender and sexuality.

If gender does not have a reciprocal relationship with sex unlike sexuality, then what is the relationship of gender to these concepts? Gender is socially constructed to control us and prevent a direct connection between sex and sexuality. Sedgwick says “gender is definitionally built into determinations of sexuality, in a way that neither of them is intertwined with…” (Sedgwick  2473). In other words, that gender is limiting our thinking to just male/female and heterosexual/homosexual concepts of sexuality. But, it does not allow us to think about other types of sexuality.  That is why we tend to not grasp the concept of alloerotic. We can also see that gender tries to enclose different types of sexuality within its confines. For instance, we see terms such as female masculinity or make femininity in references to Judith Halberstam’s “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.”

For my Archival Research class we just had to read about feminist historiographers using distant reading. The entire article was about incorporating and amending feminist methodologies for physical archives in digital ones and finding digital sources that would diversify and expand their research. Distant reading was one of the topics they brought up and I was excited to see it in this sort of practice. The goal of many feminist rhetoricians is to “recover” lost histories of women, that have been silenced in all sorts of ways. It focuses intensely on the individual stories of women; this is completely opposite in distant reading which Moretti calls a collective system, it’s entire purpose is to see the whole system in order to identify patterns. The authors of the article admit that on the surface distant reading goes against their values but could be useful in “exploring the circulation of the women’s text…of how women’s texts have appeared and traveled across time and space.” The researchers used a program called the Ngram Reader, which “reads” Google books for particular terms. The historiographers searched for Aspasia, the rhetorical teacher of Pericles. Information of this rhetor is quite slim and relies on the “accounts of others from Plato to Plutarch.” In searching Aspasia’s name they weren’t able to discover any new information about the real Aspasia but they did see when she had peaks of interest. For example, she had her highest peak in the 1870s, in which, the researchers  discovered, that her romantic relationship with Pericles was written about in two novels.

Despite the lack of new information, the feminist historiographers found distant reading useful in seeing how this woman was written about through history. Also, its a useful tool for other historiographers to discover how and what women wrote and spoke about, and how this information has been remembered and rewritten. However, the authors also mention that the source they used, the Google corpus, isn’t a perfect and unbiased, as they gather their texts from libraries that don’t keep large collections of women authors, so the information some feminist researchers may be looking for won’t be represented. Maybe, this is the hopefulness of distant reading. Yes, looking at a select few individual texts won’t give you an accurate view of the novels published at certain times, but we can’t say that distant reading does that exactly either. As men tried to push women out of the publishing world; they could of also pushed them out of institutions that held their work, pushing them out of the corpus used for distant reading. This is not to say Moretti thinks the program is absolute; for example, the pattern of the sudden disappearance of genres is not fully understood by him yet. I do think the article makes really good use of his method. The researchers are searching for a “pattern as a whole”, in looking for the ways these women’s words were rewritten. In combing with Moretti the feminist historiographers could even look at what genres women were pulled to throughout history, in attempts to get published or various cultural reasons. Overall, they created another possible way this data could be used for interpretation.

Lacan’s mirror stage involves the formation of the Ideal- I, which becomes the idealized version of ourselves. The mirror itself gives the baby nothing but, from it, the baby projects a fictional version of themselves on this visual image. The perfect Ideal-I isn’t the baby’s true self, which is just an uncoordinated mess. Similarly, Zizek’s Lady is fiction, the knight’s mirror. She is just another reflection for the knight to see a perfected version of himself.  She gives the knight nothing; she is a cold empty character, derived of any substance, but the knight projects this role onto her. She is just a representation of the ideal woman who will complete the knight. In day-to-day conversations, I hear people still sort of talk about this the idea of finding your soul mate that will complete you, or make your half a whole. It’s the same idea with the knight; through attracting the Lady’s perfection he will become the perfect man. The baby as well sees itself as a totality, a complete whole, in the mirror. The act of courtly love is never about her desires and wants of the knight but his desires and attempts to woo her. Even descriptions of her are empty; she’s never described in her strengths or talents but only as how she is the dream woman of the knight and how he tries to court her.

The Lady, like the Ideal-I is inaccessible. Lacan describe the relationship of the subject and its idealized version as asymptotical due to their inability of meeting together.  The Lady is often married in stories of courtly love and is even inaccessible in the way she’s approached. Zizek mentions, in order to get to the Object Lady the knight must use detours because “proceeding straight on ensures that we[ the knight] misses the target.’(pg2413).  The knight trying to get to his idealized woman would fail since she’s inherently empty and he would realize this as soon as he tries. But, according to Zizek, through these detours and grand gestures of attempting to court her he would actually create the Object Lady. I found this really similar to the subject and Ideal-I in Lacan’s mirror stage. First, Zizek describes the Object as a “distorted form”; in actuality this is the Ideal-I. It’s a distorted image of who the baby actually is. Also, when a baby first sees their reflection I would imagine they would try to touch it. Touching the mirror is the same as the knight proceeding straight toward the Lady. They miss the target, in order for the baby to make contact with this ideal self it sees it needs to take detours that ultimately don’t lead it to the ideal-I either. Zizek talks about the creation of artificial hindrances to give the illusion that the object is accessible. This was something I found quite interesting. I think, I remember Professor Allred mentioning that the Ideal-I isn’t directly accessible in our consciousness. I found this funny because when I first read about the Ideal-I, I immediately thought about the way I think. I always tend to think “If I were smarter/better at zyx, such and such situation wouldn’t happen” and I guilt myself, because I haven’t become this person! In reality, this ideal version of me is ridiculous and inaccesible, and even if I were to become “better” person, I still wouldn’t be satisfied, if the situation happened or not. This idea goes back to Zizek’s idea of artificial hindrance, using fake obstacles to make certain ideas about ourselves or our desires more manageable.

The mirror stage also reminded me of the masochism present in courtly love. Zizek says that masochism “is made to measure the victim”; the victim decides the limits within the contract they start with the master. The baby in the mirror stage parallels this, they initiate contact with this image, which ultimately serves as the face of their desire(d self). Also, the imago doesn’t create the parameters of the dynamic, which would be impossible since it doesn’t exist until this moment. The baby, like the victim, is never able to fully satisfy themselves in this situation, as Zizek says the “masochist constantly maintains a kind of reflective distance.”

These processes also exist as means of self-externalization. For Zizek, the victim externalizes their intimate desires, which become objects, bartered and limited with contracts. For Lacan, the mirror stage serves to establish a connection between the baby and its world, a connection between the Innenwelt and Umwelt.

The mirror stage and masochism are also described as theatrical. Lacan calls the mirror stage “a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation”(pg 1165). Similarly, masochism starts from a lack of something, for the knight it’s the Lady.  Also, masochism is totally about anticipation, for the knight, its all about anticipation, and never about receiving the desired Lady. For Zizek, the victim is also the stage director; they write the script they decide what the Master can do to them. In courtly love, in order to get Lady, the knight acts out the strict social formula to get the Lady.

and it started off with me and a group of people walking out of this hotel to go and see someone’s body. So to pass the time we decided to tell each other some stories. I’ve been married, so I introduce myself and my husbands before I tell my story. I remember saying that he was reading a book about me one day and I ripped three pages out of it and then he hit me and I fell. When I got up I hit him back. I told this story three times before I finally told my story. So what does that mean?

If you haven’t figured it out yet, what I just described was the prologue to Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales: Wif of Bathe Prologue, but I thought it would be more interesting to apply Sigmund Freud’s dream theory to something other than a dream. You know, since this is a literary theory course. So in interpreting this “dream” we must first understand that these dream thoughts are merely condensed, meagre and laconic dreams. We must understand that the mind is censoring my “dream” to protect myself against a breakdown. Or in the case of literature, the author can be be producing this piece of literature- dream to the people- self and create it so that it is not blatantly offensive to the norm, but offensive enough for the people to see an issue in society. The incidents in the book are just a manifest of a bunch of signifiers with no content because they are a means of representation for the true issue.

Though this is completely arguable, the Wif of Bathe can be seen as a commentary by Chaucer on societal norms regarding women. The Wif has often been argued a post feminist character, while others argue that Chaucer made this character to be more comical than serious. Whether you want to believe that the character is a means to laugh at women or empower them it is evident that she has a purpose in this collection of pilgrims. She is the only secular woman on the pilgrimage and the only one that speaks of the womenly woes of marriage. If we applied Freud’s theory to literature this character and her prologue and tale hold more weight than amusement. She holds the potential to be commentary on the issues in 14th century England, whether unconsciously or consciously Chaucer included her for a reason. And every word that comes from her mouth needs to be scrutinized, because she has been condensed and transformed to entertain, protect and maybe warn 14th century England about themselves.

Dear Zizek!
We did it! We made it to the end of literary theory —almost. I’m not sure if I’m allowed to write about you! again; you! see, you! were in my last post too. 

Legally Blonde Final

No Description

In Legally Blonde, “We did it!” is how Elle Woods finishes her valedictorian speech to the Class of 2004 of Harvard Law School. She throws her hands up in the air and squeals. I emulated her in my elementary school valedictorian speech; the response was laughter, whether jeering or not, I did not care much; I wanted to be Elle Woods, an independent woman who eventually rejects the man for whom she had gone through so much trouble, gets a law degree from Harvard, and wins a high-profile court case against almost everyone’s expectations. Is this embarrassing yet? Throughout my entire childhood, I always wanted to be Elle Woods; I still do, in fact, but I find myself wondering whether Elle Woods and countless other role-models such as Cristina Yang of Grey’s Anatomy, who embody fiercely independent women —notice I don’t use the verb to be — whether they are simply black holes, figments of the imagination, onto which I project my own, even inaccurate (due to all the hailing) desires. I guess I already know the answer, but what fun is that? When, according to you!, it’s all about the process. Anyway, what if everyone is the knight, especially in this culture where better is never good enough and best is impossible? What if everyone is a masochist? I think you! would agree, if you haven’t already stated it, that masochism is indeed universal and that we all have an eternal desire to be in the progressive and repeated state of desiring whether the object of desire is physical pleasure or not.

As human beings, we have an irritating tendency to look to the future and set “goals.” To make these goals, we tend to look toward someone older or more advanced in some area in order to do so; we have to build on what we already know, so we choose our role-models. Just like the knight cannot see the Lady for who she really is, we cannot see who our role-models really are, whether they are distant celebrities or our friends and family themselves. We see their Ideal-I in place of their scattered mess, namely, what they choose to express, and we are completely ignorant to what they have chosen to censor after a life-time. Therefore, we are left with a limited, censored, and edited version of themselves, Freud’s typical dream, a selfie, an instagram portfolio, if you will pardon my jargon, a black hole, or a distorted view of things. This distorted image of the other which the other voluntarily provides incites a desire because the other is perfect and we are this uncensored, scattered mess who cannot reach our Ideal-I. This is where I would argue against Lacan. When we look in the mirror, we do see the ideal version of ourselves, and, yes, internally, we are forever incompatible with the perfect, complete version of ourselves, but I would emphasize what Lacan does not, if I understood him correctly. The mirror stage is more than a solidifying stage en route to identifying yourself as separate from others; it is a stage in which you realize you are separate from yourself, which is all the more terrifying and not the least bit relieving because, due to censorship when engaging in the creation of intersubjective meaning, everyone else has seemingly achieved the Ideal-I already.

Since the mirror stage, we are incomplete, severed, and the possibility of desiring provides us with relief from that concept because when desiring we are at least trying to become whole again. Once we see the lady for who she really is, our outlet is destroyed. Moreover, once we see the lady for who she really is, our entire world is destroyed. Imagine knowing the censored parts of everyone or seeing everyone as dehiscent messes. There would be no boundaries or defining lines which order in our society demands. Our world depends on desire or unattainability, that black hole, the unattainability of the Ding an sich within us and without us.

Zizek!, I still want to be Elle Woods, but now I know she isn’t the Lady I thought she was.

P.S. You should watch 500 days of Summer. Joseph Gordon Levitt, who plays the protagonist,Tom Hansen, will tell you why.

Tom develops a mildly delusional obsession over a girl onto whom he projects all these fantasies. He thinks she’ll give his life meaning because he doesn’t care about much else going on in his life. A lot of boys and girls think their lives will have meaning if they find a partner who wants nothing else in life but them. That’s not healthy. That’s falling in love with the idea of a person, not the actual person.

Okay, JGL doesn’t know that it’s impossible to fall in love with the actual person, but everything else he says is pretty spot on.

I’m not quite sure if this is too late in the section, or completely aside the questions we examine. But questions of identity and its epistemic origin, for me, relate directly to our society’s fundamental liberal concept: property. Since I’ve read Locke (and probably since I was a kid), I’ve conceived of property as an object on which labor–as some form of energy directed at an object and meant to manipulate or alter it–is performed. Of course, I’ve never found this understanding satisfactory.  For instance, intellectual property has remained incomprehensible to me with this definition. How could one claim ownership of an abstraction?

Liberal philosophy, if I am not mistaken, is premised on the sanctity of individual liberties and a conception of labor that allows for the equal opportunity to elaborate on  one’s property. As I’ve mentioned, we attain property through the physical and mental exertions that our labor imparts on an object. In this sense, our body is our most basic property from which we exert the necessary energy to acquire more property. Such a conception is premised on a body that is, in a sense, impermeable to all but our minds–we retain total control of it biologically. Foucault would argue against this point but he would not challenge the prima facie assumption of a body-mind duality that is coexisting yet theoretically separated. Our section on psychoanalysis, however, has illuminated an all too significant aspect of ownership: identification. We choose to own most of our things in a social act that allows other people to read our clothing, for instance, as a signifier of our social standing (among many imbricated identities). The conscious decisions we make in presenting an image of ourselves to the world through an ensemble of stuff is the most patent and ubiquitous performance which Butler identifies. I want to forget her thematic focus on gender for a moment, and focus instead on the deep chasm she spells by breaking the Cartesian binary of mind-body.

How does a body that is permeable and shaped by the social discourse affect notions of property? I think a conception of identity, according to the Lacanians, is an apposite model for this little exercise. Identity formation is a reciprocal process in which the Self construes the Other as an object allowing for a sense of subjectivity, while the concomitant subject construes a Self in the Other so as to gain a sense of objectivity. Property is, in this sense, the identification of the Self in the object to which we have directed our labor. We own our bodies through the act of identifying and claiming a unifying principle with them. I could conceive, along these lines, of an intellectual property, yet I still find the concept moronic.