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stop and smell, not just the roses, but the dandelions; a daydream invoked from Kittler.

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

We can’t help but digest the horrific martial potential of a nuclear war against, for the imminent now, Jung Un’s North Korea. There’s an unnerving inference, whenever I read a NYT’s article—about U.S. defense, NK’s arm’s program, Trump’s reassuring words—that post-WWII America had when they discovered Soviet Union now have nuclear capabilities. It makes me think about T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, published post-WWI in shade of all the evil that man is capable of, whether ideology had firm infrastructure, a thought that the U.S. modernist sought to pick at. Eliot’s famous line, “I will show you fear in a handful of dust”, a line I’ve thought of during Kittler’s line, “The dream of a real visible or audible world arising from words has come to end.” (p.14)

He goes on to argue that the monopoly over human archives has ended since the mechanical invention of cinema, phonography, and typewriter, for they have parsed out the optical, acoustic, and written data flow that originated in the poetics of pre- & post- printing press. He makes special consideration for the typewriter; saying since it’s invention and popularity, the author’s intrinsic identity is anonymously disguised behind the uniformly calligraphic perfection, thus that “strangely unavoidable traces” (p.8) of a writer, is gone. Regarding effects of phonograph and cinema, the spirituality, or primal sensuality (as I’ll define later), which was manifested from hearer/audience’s active engagement, that’s rewarded as emotional memory thru “hallucination”(p.10) or reverie, is gone as well, from the “distracted person” (Benjamin, p.1069), at least when s/he’s not disinterested in the music or film.

But going back to Eliot’s ephemeral line, that reminds the inferring reader, that this world, cynically sourced by the Nietzschian ideology’s of man, is impermanent, and certainly vulnerable to a hydrogen bomb, prompts me to challenge the notion of that “the entertainment industry with it’s new sensuality” (p.14), and mechanical ability to capture the world, that literature writes of, is necessary. I’d argue, on the contrary to this notion, it compromises primal sensualities, or simple sensualities (that is superior over complex sensualities) subsequently compromises at-present emotional memory, which is more important than prudent memory, that mechanization promotes among other things, because the world, as war has proven, is impermanent. I’ll begin with two super brief historical antedotes that highlights the moral risk of complex sensualities, brought by exotic stimuli.

 

Mid-17TH century, prior to the Dutch arriving tip of what’s considered Battery Park, the Lenape Indians who seasonally settled in the woodlands of the island, unaware of any European sensualities like distilled alcohol, vegetation, and fabrics; the Lenapes were content with the untouched flora and faun, and because they would migrate to the warmer south during winter, they never needed foreign clothes or blankets. So when the foreign Dutch introduction of such exotic materials, providing a vast array of unnecessary options, overtime became a livelihood crutch per se, thus fulfilling. in a psychological sense, a greater way to fulfill Maslow’s bottom hierarchy of needs, the resulting superfluous indulgences, especially alcohol, caused the southern Manhattan demise of the tribe. In confluence with the U.S. economic boom post-WWII many hundreds year later, where consumer consumption—driven by commercial ads on TV, billboard, radio, about appliances, cars, and clothes—was at it’s highest, psychologically, the private dwellings of white America had a gaping hole the size of a meteor, that an array of materials could only fill. Consumption, positively reinforced by the country, was, and still is, therefore the interminate culture.

It is this manufactured narcissism, that historically, on a mass scale, this American dream had numbed the primal sensual self, that, again, is more important during a nuclear age, than human mechanical archiving. The solution is not to become a luddite, because technological advancements, in general, helps further distance society from the prehistoric wilderness. And I’m not proposing any transcendentalist retirement from urban America either. But to first be aware such exotic and mechanized stimuli as an inevitable sensual crutch, and two, to engage in sensual primal simplicity, because of three reasons: (1) leisurely, it’s the greatest way to interact with yourself and others casually or intimately, (2) morally, it’s the greatest way to keep a society from developing crutches, as witness from the Lenapes, and (3) psychologically, it possibly ends this anxious rat race of becoming “independently successful”, through greater emphasis on community, through the primal sensuality that bornes empathy, as the Lenapes had prior to trading with the Dutch. Knowing that such, if our nuclear-era consumer culture could, to put it simply, do more with less, we can return to what matters more than the mechanization of the human footprint, as Shelly’s Ozymandias writes, “The lone and level sands stretch far away.”

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Without WordStar, We May Have Never Had “Game of Thrones”

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

The introduction of Track Changes by Matthew G. Kirschenbaum starts by telling of an interview between the Game of Thrones author George R. R. Martin and Conan O’Brien. Through this encounter, the world seemed shocked to find out that Martin uses WordStar to write his books, mainly to avoid any distractions that come along with having a computer that is connected to the number one mode of procrastination: the internet. Though I have never used WordStar, this alone almost sells me on using this outdated DOS-era computer. I remember using websites to block any social media usage on my computer when writing papers in high school, solely for this reason.

Kirschenbaum goes onto describe how on top of that, Martin prefers WordStar for other reasons too. Martin spoke about how WordStar does exactly what he wants it to do, and nothing more, which is very important for writers: everything they write is important and purposeful, so of course they do not want a word processing program to correct something that was not a mistake to begin with. This brought Kirschenbaum to writing about the bigger idea of the way people get accustomed to ways of writing. He writes:

“ Martin’s intimate knowledge of WordStar’s functions and keyboard patterns might be best characterized as tacit  knowledge, the extraordinary combination of muscle memory and unarticulated experience that enables is to perform very complex tasks without conscious effort or consciously knowing how to do them. Tacit knowledge is necessary for the flow states many writers cite as characteristics of their most productive sessions, and they deeply resent anything that jolts them out of that zones.” (10)

A deep connection to and necessity of modes of writing seems a little dramatic, but without a doubt does exist. It is interesting to notice the way in which writing with a pen as opposed to writing on a computer changes the way that people write, along with the way they feel when writing. To connect it back to Martin, imagine if he was for some reason forced to switch from WordStar to Microsoft Word. Who knows how his writing would change. Of course the words may not be dramatically different, but the act of writing and the feeling of the writer to the writing would very much be different.

It is very interesting to think about the significance of the modes of writing. Of course it has been something I have noticed on a small-scale, like, for example, I have a pen that is made by one of my favorite musical artists, Mod Sun, and on the pen he has written “Write when it’s Right,” and even though it is not a great pen, very cheap quality, if I am going to write in a journal or write a poem, that is THE pen I use. It just has some personal significance that makes me feel totally different about what I am writing. But, even though that noticeable difference of meaning connected to that pen is something I have thought about, I never really thought about how far that extends. I never thought about Google Docs versus Microsoft Word as an area of change in what people write. Kirschenbaum does a great job exploring a seemingly basic thing, and making people think more about how much meaning exists in the different modes of writing.

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The Evolution of Media and Communication

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

In the excerpt from Gramophone, Film, Typewriter by Friedrich Kittler the reader takes a look into the evolution of new media technologies in todays society that alter the way we look at how the message flows between the addresser and the addressee. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, we see the hegemony of the printed word change to new technologies that offers new ways to communicate and store data. Before digital technology came into the mainstream, physically writing operated as a symbolic meditation in a way. All data passes through the pencil which is the signifier. For instance, photography stores the actual physical effects of the real in the shape of the actual image. From there, the typewriter changed the perception of writing from that of a unique expression of a literate individual than that of seeing the image as a material signifier.

The typewriter symbolizes a momentous shift in the history of technological advancement. Using the work of Foucault, Lacan, and McLuhan there is an analysis of the technological shift that the Typewriter caused. There is a combination of discourse analysis, structuralist psychoanalysis, and media theory that adds a vital historical dimension to the current debates over the relationship between electronic literacy and poststructuralism, and the extent to which us humans are controlled by our technologies.

There is a further comparison between Mechanical Media and Digital Media, with Mechanical Media being the break of the 1900’s , and Digital Media arising at the break of the 2000’s. During the 1900’s there was almost a monopoly of culture that was wielded by the book, if it is not in the book then it did not happen in a sense. The most famous book, the bible, can be seen in this manner. Some people believe that the only thing that can be known for certain in the bible is the written commandments on the tablets. There is almost an aura around the commandments because it is written. With written material there is a scarcity amongst them because it is the only existing form of that representation. As Benjamin theorized, the rise of mechanically reproduced art strips the aura of the original object. This is the same with media. With the introduction of digital media, media is ubiquitous and it is everywhere. The aura is stripped and it is no longer a scarce form of information. The evolution of these media outlets allows different interpretations of the message between the addresser and the addressee.

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The Materiality of Digital Technology

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

In Matthew G Kirschenbaum’s Track Changes, the author explores the relationship between the human art of writing and the form of the writing instrument. Like Kittler, again we see a theorist who thinks in terms of McLuhan’s famous aphorism: “The medium is the message”. Kirschenbaum begins his introduction by considering the recently revealed writing process of George R. R. Martin. Martin’s use of an outdated word processor gains the attention of his fans, and for good reason, says Kirschenbaum. The word processor may hold some insights about the authors work. At the very least, Martin’s adherence to it goes to show that “we can become habituated to something like a piece of software just as we do a favorite pen or a particular weight of paper” (2).

As Kirschenbaum begins, he first clarifies that the works of art that he intends to examine “are not reducible to a single explanatory agent or element” (6). This is an important principle to remember going forward, so that we do not confuse the authors focus on technology for a belief in its primacy. However, Kirschenbaum does not wish that we undervalue the effect of technology either. He quotes literary scholar Evija Trofimova, who analyses the ways in which the environment that Paul Aster wrote in affected his work, and comments, “all of this … can only become visible is one dares to turn away, for a moment, from the centered intent of the human author and to look more closely at the work of ‘things'” (9). If we are to compose a more complete understanding of an author, we should consider all of the influences on his or her writing.

In the age of digital technology, such as word processing, this observance of the “work of things” becomes less obvious. Many theorists follow what Kirschenbaum calls as “emancipatory logic” (5), which views electronic media as a dematerialization of many technological apparatus. From this perspective, word processing somehow transcends the physical limitations of writing. This reminds me of the novel You Are Not a Gadget, by Jaron Lanier. Lanier, once a programmer in the upstart Silicon Valley of the 1980’s, discusses the philosophy with which the “world wide web” was created. They all believed that they were created a technology that would make the world immune to tyranny, for there would always and forever be a free flow of information, unrestricted by the material constraints of past technologies. Lanier has since split from this philosophy, and uses his novel to explore the ways in which Web 2.0 (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.) creates very narrow channels through which people communicate digitally. The idealistic freedom that they envisioned did not survive the materiality of the technology.

Kirschenbaum, Like Lanier, does not buy into the “emancipatory logic” that considers electronic media as dematerialized communication. He argues that word processing does have materiality. One way this materiality is evidenced is through the development of “tacit knowledge,” or, “the extraordinary combination of muscle memory and unarticulated experience that enables us to perform very complex tasks without conscious effort or consciously knowing how to do them” (10). At the very least, the technology is effecting the writer in particular ways. This begs the question: Can the effects of this technology can be found in the literary work itself? For Kirschenbaum, the search for this technological materiality is an important aspect of literary criticism.

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Masculine Disparities

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

In Judith Halberstam’s “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Men, Women, and Masculinity,” Judith tries to deconstruct masculinity. Masculinity is usually applied to men and feminism is generally applied to females. Masculinity is similar to a hegemony, it shows leadership and dominance. Halberstam describes masculinity and feminism in such a way that it connotes a negative feelings towards femininity. The way she constructs her argument about masculinity, she empowers masculinity and states there are different forms of masculinity even within females and homosexual men. The question is, why is there such a negative connotation with femininity, why do we need to identify female masculinity as masculine to be empowered?

Halberstam describes masculinity in a way which masculinity dominates and while doing so, takes power from femininity. She describes, “As masculinity is ever more naturalized in hererosexual, homosexual and transexual male bodies, femininity becomes ever more degraded as a subject position and female masculinity becomes simply unimaginable” (2643). Here, Halberstam is stating how all forms of masculinity are recognized yet the female masculinity is not only seemingly shameful, it is also impossible to be understood in this (white) male dominated culture.

Halberstam describes throughout her writing that white males are the dominant group in society. She goes onto explain that having a penis is equivalent to having social power. According to Freud, we can generate social power in other body parts that become phallic and can access the social power reserved for white males. She mentions that lesbians can attain power as well, through Lacan’s framework of the “Lesbian Phallus.” Lesbianism has always been associated with female masculinity which is ultimately, undesirable and linked to female ugliness. Lesbians do however threaten heterosexual men because of the attractive lesbian who rejects them and the butch lesbian who rivals their masculinities (2652).

While deconstructing Halberstam’s words and thoughts, I can say that she identifies as a masculine female but I feel that she is using the non-masculine females, the feminine females as a stepping stone to have herself and those that identify as a masculine female get ahead in the patriarchal society. She complains that the dominant systems must be updated in order to remain relevant to the social and political systems, which I agree is true but identifying as a masculine–anything to get ahead in society is just reinforcing the patriarchal dominated culture. Females, transexuals, and homosexuals should not have to identify as anything to have their voices heard and to be taken seriously. Heterosexual white men should be stripped of the “masculine” title. Identifying as anything masculine creates the divide of social groups and creates this disparity among us. Women should strive to empower through other means, instead of ultimately backing the patriarchal system.

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Blog post #6: The Normative Society is Always Right

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner’s Sex in Public summarizes a few key ideas about the problems with heteronormativity. Heteronormativity refers to the world view that heterosexuality is the preferred and correct form of sexual orientation. Sex in Public is not about sexual acts in public, it is about the analysis of sexuality within our society. Society is structured according to heterosexuality, and this is followed by the rules that are made by polite and picture perfect families residing within the community. This structure creates a set of accepted social norms and behaviors that is supposed to help us recognize a “good” couple from a “not so good’ couple. These social codes determine who and what is proper and beneficial to society.

In a proper society, a home is for a family, a good family has good credit, and a good family has savings and go on vacations. Anything that promotes good family values is encouraged. If you don’t have a family, then society will say that you are lonely, need help for depression, or pushed to find a proper life partner for companionship. Heteronormativity is far ore concerned with how you behave in public. A heterosexual couple may not be having intercourse at all, but they can still be considered heteronormative if they behave in the way that a “good” couple should.

What most of normative society do not realize is that heteronormativity has privilege. Heterosexual standards try to dominate the queers in every way possible. Normative society believes that heterosexuality is the only way to link intimacy to a proper personal life. If a gay couple attempts to be a part of the society then they can only be accepted if they marry and raise kids “just like everyone else.” Gays and queers must be swept under the rug of normative society, and this is the privilege that heteronormativity possesses. Anything that falls outside of the normative structure is a choice and can/should be changed to fit the “correct” social order.

 

 

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Perform However You Want: Female Masculinity in Jack Halberstam’s “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly”

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

In Judith Butler’s essay, Gender Trouble, the author discusses gender as performative, in which one, under social influences, performs acts typically associated with masculinity or femininity, depending on one’s physical sex. Drag shows, in which men dress up and perform the female gender, Butler says, helps to call attention to gender as separate from the physical body, because it is such an extreme performance by a man (I use drag queens as the primary example because Butler does so, although I realize drag kings also do this) to act out the part of a hyper-feminine woman. We see that there are two parts to this: one being the fact that a physical man is covered with the signifiers of a physical woman (makeup, stiletto heels, big hair), but the other being the fact that internally, the man may “feel” like a woman, while having the physical genitals of a man.

Butler shows us that gender is not inherent, that “acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create the illusion of an interior and organizing gender core”(Butler 2549). She disassociates gender with the body, showing that history and society, not biology, define gender. However, is gender necessarily a trap, as Butler seems to make it out to be? Of course, telling men and women that they can only do certain things according to the practices of masculinity or femininity can confine people, but without those restrictions, gender itself can be an expression rather than a prison.

Jack Halberstam, in his essay, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Men, Women, and Masculinity” takes Butler’s ideas further, arguing the validity of the female masculinity, which tells us that not only is gender performed and should be disassociated form the body, but that it can and should be performed as an identity by any sex. Through a series of examples, which Halberstam calls “heterosexual conversion narratives”, he tells us how these films serve to reinforce the idea of “real”, heterosexual masculinity. The heterosexual woman in each film often ends up rejecting the hyper-masculine, undomesticated male for a “compromise man”: one who will buy milk on the way home, but will also want to sleep with her every once in awhile. But the women in these movies don’t seem happy as much as they are willing to settle, simply reinforcing that the masculine, undomesticated ideal is the one they want (Halberstam 2641). More “feminine” men or even lesbian rivals, alternative masculinities, pale in comparison in these films to the straight heterosexual male.

Halberstam even states that feminist criticism of masculinity as misogynistic is problematic, because “The responses also assiduously refuse to acknowledge even the existence of fully realized nonmale masculinities, which come in the form of lesbian fatherhood, butch identities, drag king performances, female sports icons, and so on”(Halberstam 2644). By stating masculinity to be the problem, rather than the monopolization of masculinity by the heterosexual male (and to some extent today, the homosexual male as well), we continue to associate it with men, when in reality, the two are wholly unconnected. In the same way that Saussure divorces the signifier from the signified, showing us that the bonds between the two are completely arbitrary, our author tells us that the phallus does not necessarily signify masculinity: “masculinity at the beginning of the twenty-first century can be recognized[…]as a dynamic between embodiment, identification, social privilege, racial and class formation, and desire, rather than the result of having a particular body”(Halberstam 2646). In fact, as time goes on, the signifiers of masculinity change, through the evolution of style and social practices.

But what does this mean for us? In the last section of his essay, “The Ugly: Hairy and Scary Masculine Women”, Halberstam begins to ask us, if masculinity is not a product of having a penis, why can’t women perform it as well? There is a culture, which includes the heterosexual conversion narratives mentioned before, that discourages this. The author tells us of a novel, The Woman in White, in which the masculine woman, Marian Halcombe, functions as a rival to the novel’s hero, Walter. She is shown to have a masculine, aesthetically displeasing face, and even shows these gender qualities in coaching Walter in masculinity. However, her character does not have a satisfying ending, and is mentioned by Halberstam to be “reduced to a shell of her former self”(Halberstam 2652) by the end of the novel.

By turning these women, who perform masculinity so well, into ugly creatures destined to be eradicated, heterosexual men remain the dominant example of “real” masculinity, disregarding the idea of rival masculinities. My favorite quote from this essay is Halberstam’s question to us: “Rather, why not ask whether men can ‘do’ masculinity, whether anyone can do it better?”(Halberstam 2652). Rather than seeing gender as simply a set of social practices that we must be freed from, as “radically incredible”, as Butler says (Butler 2553), the author encourages women to find their identities through the idea of gender.

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Blog #6 ” Sex In Public”

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

As I began to put the pieces together of reading this text, I started to put analyze certain words. “Sex in Public” is not about sex acts but sexuality in the public sphere. Sex seems natural but it is actually constructed. this definition is mediated by the public; Sexuality generates a multitude of relations, therefore institutions are saturated with intimacy and desire even when they aren’t explicitly “Intimacybelongs at home, and it is alluring . Linked with ideas of “the good life” Connected with the “wish” for normalcy or uncomplicated personhood where ethics is usually abstracted from Because of heterosexual culture, practices that don’t feel especially sexual or familial collaborate to produce a social norm; but intimacy can be neither heteronormative or sexual. Feelings are political and so Berlant and Warner want us to examine feelings critically queerness is a way of life, introduces queerness as culture. It is deprived from being called a culture because queerness cannot have and so their space is limited. Always offers an alternative to normativity. culture there is a distinction between culture and lifestyle; public vs private; Not simply zones where sexual acts are made public but encompassing the culture at large ;What Berlant and Warner suggest is that the world is fixed according to heterosexuality, mainly the rules of good  and nice examples of families. There exists a whole set of accepted social behaviors that give good couple from the bad couple. Normal behavior is any group of social codes that everyone agrees is accepted and well practiced and beneficial to society A home is for a family. A family needs good credit to get a home. A good family saves money for vacations. A good family goes to Disneyland for vacations. Disney characters have family values. Buying products that have family values is good. Etc. If you don’t have a family, a heteronormative society tells you that you must be depressed and desperate in need of support and encouragement. A heterosexual couple might not be having any sex at all, but they are still heteronormative if they are behaving in the way a “good” family should. Heteronormativity starts with the proper, missionary sex between married folk, but it is far more concerned with how you behave outside the bedroom. “Hormonormativity” is a big term that describes the behavior of normal gay couples as they want to marry and raise kids and act  “just like everyone else.” If heteronormativity is privileged over all the other social orders, and if it has a changeable of damaging consequences,  like Berlant and Warner says then how do gay couples challenge that order well and successfully?

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Blog Post 3: Raymond Williams on Ideology

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A first thought when reading this article is, how did we get from the “science of ideas” to the production of meanings and a system of illusory beliefs? Marx, being someone who is known for taking a word and twisting it to his benefit, has expressed the more obvious definition of  ideology but for anyone who looked further, they would not necessarily think of it as a full science of ideas. The article doesn’t blame Marx completely as it states the transition and development of language as a key factor in why we have the definitions we do now. We seem to get lost in translation with the different variation but it strikes me that Williams is trying to differentiate and explain but there really isn’t that big of a difference. Ideology has to be a natural science and that is understood but that also leaves room for it to have definitions that include illusions and class systems. Natural and social sciences go hand in hand and that could be a large reason ideology was able to evolve into something much different than originally planned. The article mentions ideology taking the place of Metaphysics and that definitely leads strait into Marx so there was no surprise that there were later different versions classified by Marx.

Ideology in the sense of right and wrong is the easiest to understand. Our ideas, interests, and conflicts are all apart of our consciousness that wasn’t believed to be unlocked until and ideology is bestowed upon us. At the very least that’s what the article wants us to understand. That’s a bit on the dramatic side but thats to come with Marxism. consciousness, in it’s truest form, plays a large part in understanding ideology. Marx believed in changing the world instead of interpreting it and that ties together all the variations of ideology. What we believe, whether it be about class structure, personal opinions, or unrealistic notions, we are still trying to make others understand why we believe what we do while also trying to change their ideologies. We no longer interpret and feel empathy; instead we push to change the world to make it better in our eyes. Ideologies are literally our ideas and how we display them for the world to see. Williams is aware of that and yet still felt he needed to explain every aspect in hopes others would get a better grasp on the world.

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The Public Nature of Privacy

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

In their article, Sex in Public, Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner make sharp social commentaries on what it means to live in our heteronormative society. They discuss the definition of heteronormativity and how it stems for a sense of privilege and a need for social purity. Interestingly too, as per the title’s namesake, they discuss why exactly the notion of “sex in public” is considered so taboo based on the constructs set in place by heteronormativivity, and the fact that “queer” love and intimacy in general is strictly confined to spaces that are separate and private from the public. This in turn causes the public to mediate any sort of queerness, and ultimately makes all sex and intimacy public, despite the heteronormative need to suppress all queerness.

In hashing out what exactly heteronormativity means, the two authors begin by comparing the idea to multi-ethnic integration (ie- such as found in immigration) in the United States. They use the example of a magazine cover that displays a photo of an ethnically unidentifiable woman, muttering the fact that decades down the line there will have been so much cross-racial reproduction in America that race will not be considered when thinking about what it is to be American. The authors use this as an example of a societal attempt at easing the “white-dominated society” into the potential shaking of their “’core’ national culture” (2601). It is so hard for our dominantly Caucasian society to swallow the idea that their perceived purity would one day no longer exist, to the point where their hand must be held through it all. And that is the crux of the definition of heteronormativity that Berlant and Warner present, as they state, “This sense of rightness-embedded in things and not just in sex- is what we call heteronormativity. Heteronormativity is more than ideology, or prejudice, or phobia against gays and lesbians; it is produced in almost every aspect of the forms and arrangements of social life…” (2605). The privilege of being the dominant culture in society brings with it a fear of difference, which in turn harbors tailored constructs, such as the normalcy Americans find in heterosexuality, that enable this perceived pure society to maintain its existence through repression of sexuality in public spaces. Most suppressed is “queer,” or homosexual sexuality as it is so difficult for the heteronormative citizen to define it and allow its existence in their constructed universe based on their privilege.

Moving off the fact that fact, intimacy must therefore be separate from the public sphere according to Berlant and Warner. In turn, they argue that “…Although the intimate relations of private personhood appear to be the realm of sexuality itself, allowing “sex in public” to appear like matter out of place, intimacy is itself publicly mediated, in several senses” (2604). Therefore, while intimacy is for only the private sphere, it has therefore become a public act based on the fact that its activity is mediated by the aversion of the public. It is confusing to think about, but the truth is that if we are constantly trying to avoid the public in our sexual acts, then those sexual acts therefore belong to the public by the fact that we are answering to the public in hiding from it. The irony is that the original attempt at securing these non-conforming sexual acts to privacy, it causes these acts to become a part of public society.

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