Something I noticed throughout the semester is that, like Saussure, theorists split their object of research and analysis into several parts. Sigmund Freud follows this way of analysis in his “Interpretation of Dreams” but there are some discrepancies. This chapter of his book gives us an insight to the psychoanalytic manner of interpreting dreams. Before talking about dreams, Freud introduces us to the idea of the unconscious by explains the Oedipus complex. Freud says, “It is the fate of all of us, perhaps, to direct our first sexual impulses towards our mother and our first hatred and first murderous wish against our father” (Freud 816). This statement give us an insight of what is the unconscious mind; the unconscious, the id, mind contains our deepest sexual desires, murderous wish and any kind of thought that is considered immoral and/or unrealistic . But these thoughts do not get to the conscious mind, and if they do then we have a case of psychoneurosis. With this said, let’s look at Freud’s analysis of dreams.

Freud split dreams into two elements. Freud states that in order to properly interpret dreams its necessary to analyze the latent content and manifest. The latent content contains the “dream-thoughts” which are the thoughts in the id inaccessible to the ego. On the other hand, the manifest content contains the “dream-content” which are the events or pictographic symbols that we tend to remember when we wake up. These are the two elements that compose a dream. According to Freud, the dream-content “seems like a transcript of the dream thoughts into another mode of expression…” (Freud 819). What it means is that the process of dreaming is about turning dream-thoughts into dream content.

At first glance, this relationship is similar to how Saussure splits language. Saussure describes language as a system of sign and split the sign in two parts. Likewise, Freud split dreams. Saussure splits the sign into the signified and the signifier. The signifier is what we use to express the concept or signified. Similarly, the manifest contest expresses what is present in the latent content. Both theorist go into a deep explanation on how this relation works. However, this similarity does not get any further.

There are discrepancies between these theories. Saussure describes the relation between the signifier and signified as arbitrary. In addition, language, in Saussure’s perspective, is linear; it is a simple and direct connection easy to understand because language is a natural tool we use to survive. On the other hand, Freud’s interpretation of dreams states that the relation between the latent content and manifest content is transitional. That is to say, the former is the translation of the latter (Freud 818-9). Additionally, the relation between the latent content and manifest content is quite complex due to several reasons: One, the unconscious or id do not speak the same language we consciously do. Therefore, accurate translation and interpretation of the dream is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, the dream-content can have a meaning of its own or not make sense at all despite being one side of a coin. We have to analyze it deep and critically enough to grasp an idea of what is the dream-thought is.

We have to go through many layers to achieve complete understanding. We have to consider what Freud called “condensation.” Freud says, “Dreams are brief, meagre and laconic in comparison with the rage and wealth of the dream-thoughts” (Freud 819). It means that manifest content only contains a piece or a condensed version of the dream-thought from which we have to decipher the deeper meaning. We also have to consider that the dream-thoughts are “censored” when transfer to the ego or conscious because it is information that would affect us psychologically (Freud 820). To sum up Freud’s theory about dream interpretation have some similarities with Saussure’s Theory of language but they have a lot of differences.

According to Freud “I announce that the fetish is a substitute for the penis, I shall create disappointment; so i hasten to add that it is not a substitute for any chance penis.” (Freud 842) He then goes on to say the people with fetishes are substituting the mother’s imaginary penis. When we first discover that our parents have different sexual organs that we refuse to believe that our mother had a penis that had been castrated because as men we would feel in danger of losing our own. He relates this to our own narcissism and how we repress the fact that our mothers do not have a penis and use the fetish as a substitute. In class we were asked about our own fetish and no one wanted to share for what I presume to be fear of judgment, but nevertheless I will share mine. I like big butts and I cannot lie. There I have said it now lets move on to how Freud would analysis me. If I were to sit on a couch and tell Freud about my fetish he might come to his conclusion that at a point during my youth I noticed my mother did not have a penis when she bent over or some weird thing like that. But this theory could not be more wrong. First and foremost both genders are able to have fetishes and this limits fetishism to only males. Second in my personal experience fetishism does not have to substitute for any kind of penis whether it be a mother imaginary penis because it does not fit to the growth of the human mind. What I mean is at a young age I would not have a memory of not seeing my mother not having a penis and repress it until the age where we start having sexual interest and have it manifest. I would think that the manifestation of a fetish would spark around the time of sexual identity.

Another reason why Freud’s thoughts on fetishism does not work is in the read we had for Zizek. Zizek talks about the movie “The Crying Game” where the character Fergus is told to visit a captured British soldier’s girlfriend Dil.  Fergus falls in love with Dil and purses her. After finally accepting his pursing of her Dil gives in and when they are about to have relations it is revealed that Dil is a transvestite as we call it now transsexual. Fergus confused and put off in this moment. Also in this moment Zizek says “This scene of the failed sexual encounter is structured as the exact inversion of the scene referred to by Freud as the primordial trauma of fetishism: the child gaze, sliding down the naked female body towards the sexual organ, is shocked to find nothing where one to expect to see something (a penis) in the case of “The Crying Game”, the shock is caused when the eye finds something where it expected nothing.” (Zizek 2421) This moment is ironic because the repression is no longer repressed. In fact there is “mom’s penis” but it does not bring satisfaction for Fergus. It does not satisfy his sexual needs for the repression to manifest therefore fetishism in Freud’s eyes does not work. Speaking as a heterosexual male I do not see how in fact I would be worried about castration when I noticed my parents have different sexual organs. Could it just be that boys are boy and girls are girls? What I mean is when we categorize people as children we can say mommy is a girl because she does not have a penis and daddy is a boy because he does have one. Instead Freud makes it seem like men with a fetish is trying to substitute for what the mother does not have and that just is not the case.

Blog #2 linguistics

Language-the concept of a sound created from the movement of the lips and tongue. Yet still without doing so one is able to recite a mental verse with the sound images on our head. The concept of the “phoneme” which is the sound of the word determined by vocal activity is eliminated from the Saussure’s views on language and the mind. The concept in translated into a sound image by the carrier we associate with the concept as an individual. We settle on the vocal activity to express this concept because we know no better option.

The arbitrary sign-within every society there is a set based of expressions, which are based on principal.

The function of language regarding thought is to create the precise and individual phonic sound in the expression of idea to link thought and sound.

The division between “thought-sound” is shapeless and implies division; Saussure compares the process to air pressure, water and atmospheric change, which turn into waves. When its windy the waves are larger and the opposite when not. The signified (wave) is more or less depending on the link (carrier), which represents the scale of the wave in this case (sound-image). The only reason the water has big waves or small waves are because it only knows to react or be so from the carrier to the concept or signified to signifier.

The way language and money relate is they both can be exchanged and compared. Exchanged for something of dissimilar value, which is to be, determined i.e. a piece of bread. It is compared to something similar in the exchange from a pound or dollars, which may slightly vary in exact value, put, serve same concrete purpose.

Saussure’s comparison to Greek architecture in defining the difference between “syntagmatic” and “associative” relations in style to words in groups which tie together, linking to part of a whole and at the same time remaining individual.

The individuality in speech in how one combines the words from these various groups together. The freedom of combination results that all synthases are not equally free.

Blog 5

The Cost Disease: Started From The Bottom Now…

The high arts and the individual’s reality of earning a living in a capitalist society follow two general realities according to Ross. One, the individual who holds the skills necessary to obtain intellectual professions such as professors, writers, painters etc. spends as much time, if not more obtaining the qualifications in order to hold these positions, yet receive much less capital gain than the, “others” for the honor they feel they receive in working in the profession they do. They feel it is an honor and privilege to be qualified enough to hold such a position of prestige that to place a monetary value on it is beneath them. In addition the cost of the performance has risen with the heightened technology-of actors per say which leave these intellectuals having to learn and develop more and more to keep up with the desires of the audience-special effects on Broadway. The amount of money to produce such a spectacle is much higher and the person who is affected by the increase in the price in the production is the amount the artist is paid. We all see how well that worked out for the actor who played Spiderman-who was actually harmed quite badly during a live performance. All due to the audience demands of artificial excitement in the art of story telling. Do the special effects make the performance any better? Is it impossible to imagine a flying spider man, rather than see the actor, we know cannot fly and shot cobwebs from his finger tips, pretend to do so with these “special” effects.

Who is to blame for the artists willingness to provide services in which they worked hard toward mastering, yet receive unfair compensation for the services they provide?

The response from the public is enhanced when there is mystery behind the artist’s work, especially if there is a public message and agenda behind the master’s skill. A perfect example of this is Banksy-a graffiti artist whose career and prestige is based soley on his ability to remain concealed. If we knew who he was and that he was capitalizing off of his very controversial and sometimes even illegal public displays-would we believe it? Would we care? Or would it just be some more spray paint vandalism?

I found the very last tid bit on the black artist and the demands of being paid in full to be interesting. The already suppressed nature of the black culture in turn generated an artist who demanded to be “paid in full”. The concept of being, “all about the Benjamin’s” in comparison to the white bohemian was not looked down upon. The “starving artist” is celebrated and recognized in the white community as heroic. Contrary, to the already suppressed history of the black community, talking about money and material gain is celebrated and remains a lyrical trend- in the hip hop community.

What would Nietzsche and Marx say about the 21st, and its changes in language and material relations?

Our reading Ross reminded me of a piece of content I came across on the Internet a bit ago: a long manifesto regarding our usage of social media, and the assertion that, by using social networking sites, we are engaging in a kind of literal labor that we are being drastically under-compensated for.

I’ll return to this idea later in this response, but I wish to lead with the mention of this manifesto as to stir the thought that the Internet has been a really remarkable and disruptive technology, penetrative of a lot of degrees of human life.. In Marx’s consideration, revolutionary shifts in society have always occurred after a modification of the base by technological change slowly ripples up through the superstructure. I would argue, as I’m sure many would agree, that the adoption of the World Wide Web has been the great technological change of Generation Y’s time, and a marker of transition between epochs.

To follow Nietzsche’s cue of uncovering the secret intentions of words, it seem inescapable to notice that a groundswell of language has followed with the usage of Internet and, even, new ways of mutating and creating meaningful language-image-signs. The meme, for instance, is an example of social construction assembled in a language community that exists together even if its individual members occupy very different places in space. Memes, often containing words and images but sometimes only one or the other, are immensely flexible and often one meme is recycled and incorporated into another, linking ideas in chains of signification. One attuned to the the etymology of memes would see that they can be carefully traced from one site (and accompanying language-community) to another, or sometimes developing on a single platform.

Just as Nietzsche fiercely distrusts the virtuous idea of “good”, so can we now look to a number of new “virtues” in this Internet age. The literature from a new telephone that has come into my possession implores me: “Stay connected with MOBILE LIVING“. Before the 21st century, would I possibly have been so concerned with the importance of “sharing”– “Sharing” was once taught to us by our parents; today, that authoritative role may be supplanted by Facebook, who teach us to “share” in our own way, upholding the modern construct of individuality. Conversely, the current connotation of “oversharing” is more complex now that it doesn’t necessarily refer to speech acts with limited temporal existences.

There are many, many examples of these kinds of newly minted words–they crop up each day– and the fact that I can’t recall them all easily only illustrates that, normalized through their everyday use, their new layers of meaning are subtly meshed within the way I view the world. And to pull back, as to gain appropriate distance for their comprehension, requires a little straining. Like Nietzsche, I want to assert that the positive connotation of many of these words reveals an insidious truth– in our preoccupation with “sharing” and “staying connected”, we are deceiving ourselves as to our quite opposite real social conditions

These conditions, as Marx might note, come now at the end of very long story about humans and labor: we have seen the shift from the serfdom through the Industrial Revolution (the technological change mentioned before) engendering the relationships between capitalists and proletariat, the emergence of the bourgeoisie; skipping forward a bit and and narrowing scope, we see the ascent, peak, and slow decline of labor following World War II, the simultaneous decline in manufacturing in the Global North as it shifts elsewhere in the world, capital flows opening up internationally as the development of shipping containers completely changes the way commerce is conceived and physically exchanged, the ascendancy of Global Cities and the shift of blue-collar, labor-union dominated work to white-collar service work, the shift away from Welfare State economics to a Neoliberal ideology, the extreme manifestation of the Free Market, the development of the Internet and rise to pre-eminence of Information as a new economic unit value.

Just as Capitalism had traditionally reduced workers to their ability to create commodities, so has this most recent iteration of capitalism focused on humans as creators of information (and to put it less humanistically: data). To refer back to the manifesto noted at the beginning of this response, the many users of Facebook, whether they know it or not, are harnessed to stimulate digital lines of economy: their personal data is mined and sold by large social media companies to advertising agencies who, using the information that we passively shed into the Infosphere, help online retailers market commodities back to us– at the end of the day, there is something like Marx’s surplus-value created and, as if by some unfunny joke, it obviously does not come back to us. If workers of the past could look forward to meager wage-compensation, we–the “social” laborers of the Internet– have nothing but the unremarkable carrot of “sociability” provided to us for our toil.

In reality: we are all sitting at our computers. We are no longer “out in the world” or the streets or what-have-you, seeing our fellow laborers eye-to-eye and engaging in socializing despite our labor-alienation. To play with Marx’s words a little bit, what were once social relationships between commodities are now social relationships between media. We are “connected” incorporeally, deprived of the world by our social conditions, which are masked from us just the same. We do not necessarily understand the neuroses that Internet-material-relations engender, but we know that our modes of socializing soothe that same nerve that they agitate. We are given the snake oil prescriptions of “mobile living” and “staying connected”, not realizing that they are infact the very illness we are sick from.

How does Foucault reconstitute Marxist thought so as to apply it to sex?

At first read, it is difficult to perceive Michel Foucault’s strain of Marxist influence. He does not address the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, or the means of production. In fact, in this excerpt, economics do not figure a predominant role. Indeed, his terminology foregoes the usual jargon and exchanges it for language such as power and discourse. These terms remain vague and have less political overtone then Gramsci’s use of hegemony or Althusser’s RSAs and ISAs. Yet, Gramsci and Althuser are crucial to a conceptual understanding of Foucault’s underlying assumptions. Although Foucault’s development and application of Marxist thought is highly original, he remains a Marxist in his theoretical approach.

Gramsci is a crucial, yet subdued, consideration within Foucault’s argument. The premise that everyone is an intellectual accedes to ideology a quotidian exercise that reinforces the ideology of the controlling class and their traditional intellectuals. As Gramsci elucidates, ideology is “’mediated’ by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the ‘functionaries’” (1142). Foucault structures his argument around the functionary role of private institutions in regulating sexual behaviors (e.g. doctors, psychologist, and families). Without the private efforts of intellectuals (i.e. everyone) at rooting out deviants and perverts, the extrapolation of sexual identities could not have been accomplished.

Still, Althusser’s theorization, based largely on Gramsci, formulates the structure of Foucault’s theory. Although Foucault does not borrow from Althusser’s vocabulary or wretched prose, the influence of hegemony and ideology is evident in Foucault’s formulation of power and discourse. The crux of Foucault’s argument is reliant on Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatus that functions “massively and predominantly by ideology” as well as, in the second resort, to repression (1342). However, Foucault reconfigures ideology into an “analytical discourse” that objectified and rationalized sex, and which was then “meant to yield multiple effects of displacement, intensification, reorientation, and modification of desire itself” (1506. 1512). Yes, the discourse repressed those non-normative sexualities, but in order to do so it had to essentially discover them.  In such a way, “sex was taken charge of, tracked down as it were, by a discourse that aimed to allow it no obscurity, no respite” (1504). Foucault follows Althusser’s argumentation that “the ideology of ideology…recognizes…that the ideas of a human subject exist in his actions…and if that is not the case, it lends him other ideas corresponding to the actions (however perverse) that he does perform” (1354). Actions then situate ideology in the material realm and are thus subject to the same ideological formulations as ideas. Therein, until the taxonomy of sexual tendencies was accomplished, discourse remained powerless where it was ignorant. Indeed, Althusser had already formulated that “ideology has the function…of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects” so that “there is no practice except by and in an ideology…[and] there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subject” (1355). Within this framework, discourse gained ever more power as it inculcated ever more subjects through its proliferation of sexual categories. A “centrifugal movement with respect to heterosexual monogamy” flourished as discourse penetrated the peripheries of society’s sexuality, allowing the normative heterosexual monogamous married couple a silence in the discourse (1514). Such silence allows the normative couple the agency to operate undefined thus relatively untrammeled within the discourse.

As delineated, Foucault’s argument does rely on the material focus of Marxist philosophy. However, it broaches an area of reality that was once thought to be independent, purely biological, and impregnates it with ideological, or discursive, awareness. Hegemony, or power, as argued by Foucault, is reproduced in even the most intimate of actions or thoughts. Although Foucault does not address the traditional questions of Marxism, his theorization is deeply embedded in that strain of thought.

via Academia, Not Edu — Medium.

Since we’ve just read Andrew Ross on “mental labor,” check out this short piece by Kathleen Fitzpatrick, a wonderful scholar of media and the “digital humanities,” about the relationship between academic publishing and for-profit platforms for disseminating such work.

Ferdinand de Saussure and Paul de Man are theorists of different epochs. Yet they focus on the same theme of linguistics. Saussure created the theory in the book Course in General Linguistics while de Man wrote an essay called “Semiology and Rhetoric.” Their theorist share many similarities. But, at the same time, there are many differences in both literary works.

Saussure, as well as de Man, agrees that linguistics should be focused on the structure of language itself and how they convey meaning instead of just the meaning itself. Saussure states that linguistics “never attempted to determine the nature of the object it was studying, and without this elementary operation a science cannot develop an appropriate method.” In this statement Saussure also asserts that the methods of linguistics fail to decipher language itself, and thus, new techniques should me developed. De Man says something similar; he says that: “The code is unusually conspicuous, complex, and enigmatic; it attracts and inordinate amount of attention and this attention has to acquire the rigor of a method.” In other words, de Man also agrees that linguistics needs to develop more techniques to study language. One minor difference in their ideals is that Saussure refers to the creation of a new science called semiology; de Man refers to focus on studying intrinsic formalism.

Another way in which these theorists agree is in the structure of language. Saussure defines language as a “system of signs.” Every sentence, phrase, and moreover, word is a sign. A sign in composed by a signified, the concept or idea, and the signifier, the sound-image. This is the most basic structure of language defined by Saussure. De Man talks about the same concept using the terms “form and content.” Form is language it self and how it convey meaning while content is the concept that we try to convey. When a word is spoken, the sound pups up an image in our heads that is connected to a concept.

However, Saussure and de Man disagree on the degree to which the function of signifier and signified is true.

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I would say that Ferdinand de Saussure’s interpretation of language (commonly referred to as semiotics) only agrees with Friedrich Nietzsche’s interpretation on the very base level. While both men agree that language is fundamentally used as a bridge between concepts and material objects to the communication of such amongst humans, the two have differing views as to the end result of what language brings.

Nietzsche’s analysis of language has its foundation on his exploration of human nature. He asserts that human beings are deceitful creatures that are full of nothing but lies, which ultimately permeates into language itself. Nietzsche states: “They are deeply immersed in illusions and dream-images; their eyes merely glide across the surface of things and see ‘forms’; nowhere does their perception lead into truth; instead it is content to receive stimuli and, as it were, to play with its fingers on the back of things,” (765). The argument of humans unable to understand or even see “truth” is rooted in the conflict of objectivity vs. subjectivity. As people, we often are unable to interpret occurrences beyond our own subjective viewpoint. What one person gathers when seeing (or hearing) something or someone may be different from another person’s interpretation of the exact same context. As a result of being confined to individual subjectivities (their “dream-images” and “forms”), human beings are thus unable to see the ultimate truth. An example of this is modern-day news media; most mainstream television news channels and newspapers have their own obvious political bias and agenda, implanting their subjective account of the news onto the masses, as opposed to informing them of the truth. Furthermore, this lack of objectivity permeates into language itself, especially its application by human beings. Nietzsche states how language is essentially full of lies, stating how “truth” is, “A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time, strike a people as firmly established, canonical, and binding; truths are illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors which have become worn by frequent use and have lose all sensuous vigour, coins which, having lost their stamp, are now regarded as metal and no longer as coins,” (768). Nietzsche argues here that language has been buried by lies upon lies to the degree in which truth ceases to exist. Instead of gaining understanding of the material around us, language has only been used by humans to perpetuate metaphors, which by Nietzsche’s rationale only serve as “illusions”. Due to the saturation of metaphors within language, language itself ceases to have any meaning – it just becomes useless noise. The irony here is how language itself was created for the function of conveying and understanding the truth, but in practice has alienated us from it. As a result, language becomes arbitrary.

To reiterate, Saussure’s understanding of language is coined as semiotics. More specifically, this means that language is interpreted through a system of signs. The concept or material object/being that is being conveyed through language is referred to as the “signified”, while the linguistic term used to convey said concept or material is the “signifier”. When both the signified and signifier are joined together, a “sign” is created (853). Saussure best conveys this language dynamic when he compares the signifier and signified as two sides of one sheet of paper: “thought is the front and sound the back; one cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the same time; likewise in language, one can neither divide sound from thought nor thought from sound,” (857). In the relationship between the signifier and signified, without one the other is lost. Take the relationship between the term “car” and the physical object that the term signifies. Without the physical automobile, the term “car” would be rendered arbitrary and useless. Likewise, without the signifier of “car”, we as humans would be unable to convey to each other and understand what the physical automobile is. Thus, without the signifier, the signified ceases to exist – and vice-versa. This dynamic of language that comes from semiotics is precisely where Saussure contrasts from Nietzsche. From Nietzsche’s perspective, language is fundamentally built on lies, ultimately distorting and shielding us from seeing the truth. By contrast, Saussure’s view of language dictates that we can only understand the truth through language, and that language and material/concepts are bound together. Where Nietzsche believes that language is used for deceiving, Saussure asserts that language is used for discovery and understanding.

How might have Foucault’s enumerations of the consequences of the “new specification of individuals”  been received by Nietzsche? Would he have argued that it was a liberating move or have agreed that it was a repressive one? If the latter, what might be the means to liberation (for Nietzsche)?

Foucault’s “new specification of individuals” refers to the time in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries during which mad men and women, criminals, and homosexuals, yet defined as such, had to “make the difficult confession” as to “what they were” (1515). Foucault focuses on the individuation of sexualities beyond the scope of heterosexual monogamy. Foucault says that once these “scattered sexualities rigidified,” they were given form by being identified in age, place, and type (1520). Thus they were no longer alien but familiar. Although such definitions might be interpreted as recognition and progressive of the “other” and although the individuation of the “other,” once strange, might seem synonymous to the humanization of such a person, Foucault’s point is not to portray these two centuries as necessarily progressive, though, he  definitely agrees they are less prudish than the ones before. Foucault’s main argument is that the individuation and solidification of such sexualities led to the proliferation of centers dedicated to controlling and analyzing sex; sex, which used to be of a private nature became a public discussion by those intent on exerting power over the act of reproduction. Definitions meant boundaries and lines to-be-crossed, it did not mean liberation. Nietzsche would have agreed had he achieved immortality beyond the scope of the written word. However, Nietzsche would focus more on the effects of the newly architected language necessary to an efficient dialogue about sex and less on the insatiable curiosity of the doctors and psychoanalysts and the sexually charged power dynamics between clinician and patient.

According to Nietzsche, the definition of something (or someone, in this case) reached by a group of (or an individual of) the human species will only be accurate in relation to human beings; “truth” manifested by humans will be but a “metamorphosis of the world” (769). All we will ever achieve is the mutation of the Ding an sich, the thing itself. Here is the first problem: while we may apparently individuate the homosexual or the child masturbating by giving him a “case history,” a “childhood,” and so on, we never succeed in actually making him an individual, according to Nietzsche (and Saussure), because his identity depends on its difference or similarities to other individuals. The concept of the homosexual is never independent of the concept of the heterosexual. Thus, those in charge not only rob those who identify with a sexuality different from heterosexual but the heterosexual, himself, against whom few to none have harmful prejudices, as well. Of course, humans succeed in stripping identities from all things due to their “unconquerable urge to let themselves be deceived” (772).

  Furthermore, Nietzsche says that this ability of humans, to form schemata, defined by dictionary.com as “mental models of aspects of the world to facilitate the processes of cognition and perception,” makes possible the “creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, definitions of borders, which now confronts the other, sensuously perceived, [animal’s] world as something firmer, more general, more familiar more human and hence as something regulatory and imperative” (768). It has been established that the recognition of the homosexual or the heterosexual as persons leads only to a “feeling of truth.” Nietzsche tacks on that this feeling is a dangerous and a repressive one. The conceptualization of aspects of the world creates for humans the idea that they have sought and successfully found a truth, when, in reality, the truth is a projection of the human being onto the world. Nonetheless, the familiarity with the “other” and the comradeship now established with the “other” allows the human being to believe he has the right to regulate the “other” due to his new understanding of it. He (or she) now knows best. (See: women’s bodies (abortion), people’s lives (the death penalty), and animals’ lives (food).

Foucault does not address what might liberate us and our sexualities from this increasingly repressive power, but perhaps language, just as it can imprison us, might liberate us too. Nietzsche writes: “whereas every metaphor standing for a sensuous perception is individual and unique and is therefore always able to escape classification, the great edifice of concept exhibits the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium” (768). Nietzsche offers a leeway to be individual and unique, to be defined intrinsically, in and of ourselves. It is metaphor or myth for the Ancient Greeks (772). To relate this to our class discussion, liberation might be discovered in the word queer. An “anything is possible at any time” type of sexuality which leaves one to play with their imagination and penetrates the boundaries of static definition or of the conceptualization and thereby, de-individuation of something or someone (772). For Nietzsche, liberation is living in the uncertainty and embracing the unknowability of the world by creating illusions which we recognize as such and do not try to install into the memory of the human psyche as factual.