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Nietzche’s Assumption

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

“On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”

A brief moment in this piece that stood out to me as Nietzche argued about the idea that language is a lie and provides an example of a poor man saying “I am rich” (p. 766) clearly stated with the intent to introduce deception in the simplest way. However, one cannot simply tell whether or not the person is lying because of the context of the word “rich,” which can mean more things than one, something Nietzsche does not consider. Perhaps if he defined what makes something or someone rich, it would be better understood as to why the speaker of the statement would be considered a liar. Webster’s dictionary would define it as as an abundance of something, meaning Nietzche’s unstated assumption is that the poor man was on the topic of money. How else can the poor man be rich, aside from that? Culture? Love? Respect? Humility? For the above reason I would have to disagree with Nietzsche. Though lies can be created by language, the existence of it depends on our ability to describe. To me, language is a point of discovery.

As he mentioned in the literary work, language is like pocket change when it is no longer innovative and invented. However, I like to think that language is a form of art; it is something that is constantly changing according to the times we live in. We can see this in the way that spelling of words have changed over time – like “colour” to “color”. We can also see this in artistic works – novels, poetry, etc. We rely on artists to create new ways for us to imagine and so they bring to language words that would not exist. We can see things that aren’t really there through language. In this way, we able to have an image of things like mermaids and dragons. An artist’s an ability to arrange words creatively by rejecting certain literary rules and accepting unconventional rules allow others to explore the ways in which we can communicate. All the while, context and contact are always important.

I mention the above to agree that language is a simple invention. However, he forgets to mention the truths in language, the practicality and the functions are somewhat ignored. Language is not simply the way we communicate as humans. Animals have their own languages by sounds and gestures in the same ways we do. Whether it’d be through gestures, facial expressions, words, sounds, language is every way to provide a message. We humans have a strong liking for artfully creating a word to attach to a specific meaning, to refer to one specific thing. Through writing, either informative or as an art, there is a voice of personality and there is subjectivity. This can be witnessed by museum and/or exhibit display. We agree with what is written as a description of a piece and believe that it is true because museums have credibility. In sum, it is not language in general that is a lie, it is speech.

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Nietzsche What is a truth and what is a lie?

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

In Nietzsche’s essay, he examines the characteristics of a truth and a lie. He says “The stone is hard’, as if ‘hard’ were something known to us in some other way and not merely as an entirely subjective stimulus?”. Nietzsche tells us that humans use metaphors to put experience in a type of order in an attempt to make an overall understanding. Humans get a definition of “hard” from experiencing it in their life. We then use the word hard to describe our experience in relation to the rock. Nietzsche argues that even though we put these experiences into metaphors, it doesn’t capture each experience we have at different times.

Nietzsche also argues that a simply concept of looking at a leaf is overall grouped into one experience instead of a different one in each encounter. Every leaf isn’t the same but for us a humans to understand each other we come to the same truth that a leaf is a leaf and they don’t differ.

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Blog Post 1: Nietzsche ” On Truth and Lies in a non moral sense”

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

“There is nothing so reprehensible and unimportant in nature that it would not immediately swell up like a balloon at the slightest puff of this power of knowing.”

The gnat and humans are both within the center of the universe; however it is not the same universe. What I mean by this is, yes, they both share the same physical universe but both have their own individual mental universe. They both have this perception that the universe revolves around them solely.  (The physical universe has it own center). Nietzsche is saying that if a gnat were to gain the power of knowing then it’s universe it’s perception it’s very existence, it would become prideful. it would become hubris in it’s nature of believing that the universe does revolve around it. So, too with humans. Humans with every achievement every step forward  they want to be admired they want to continually stand at what they believe to be the center of the universe because that is what they want. They want everything to be about them, just them.

(Lost my thought….sorry)

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Two more quick things

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

You may want to “follow” our blog via email to receive updates when there’s a new post.  If you do, click on the menu icon at the top of our blog:

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Second, you may want to associate an image (selfie or any image you think captures you in some way) with your username for your posts/comments.  This is called a “gravatar” and it’s very easy to set one up.

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Writing (and reading, and book learning): What is it good for?

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

I am struck by a kind of humor in the way that writing (text and whatever essential knowledge lives within it) is often placed in relation to the person experiencing it, and what that correspondence means for the person—specifically, whether something is being gained or added to the human’s cognitive capacity or feeling of self, or whatever other metric one wants to use.

I think a fundamental view that we are often raised with is that education (note: definitely a meritocracy) is about self-enrichment and that

a. either our reservoir of understanding is this vessel of infinite capacity that we can endlessly continue to fill up, or that

b. if it has a fixed capacity, that which goes in it is diluted or morphed, eventually yielding the end product of some completely refined, “correct”, pure understanding.

On page 9 of “What is Theory?” Culler provides a quick walk through one of Derrida’s deconstructive passages, and there is a focus on the use of the word supplement:

“Rousseau follows this tradition, which has passed into common sense, when he writes ‘Languages are made to be spoken; writing serves only as a supplement to speech.’ Here Derrida intervenes, asking ‘what is a supplement?’ Webster’s defines supplement as ‘something that completes of makes an addition’. Does writing ‘complete’ speech by supplying something essential that was missing, or does it add something that speech could perfectly well do without?”

Without attempting to deeply explain Derrida, something I am far from ready to even walk the perimeter of, what I get is that there is a deep concern with the nature of the thing being discussed, and a fear that even attempting to delineate something is prone to corrupting it or yielding a pointless endeavor.

With the question of our ability to get at this underlying thing held in mind, I find thinking about our lifelong education—a process that is now, for many, past the decade (and a half) mark and might even continue. So many books ingested, and ideas digested (maybe) and—how much further along are we, really? Has book learning supplied that essential something? Has it given us something we could have done without? Have the contents of our mind-vessel increased since the start of the process?

Which is all why I chuckled at Eagleton’s cynicism when he writes on page 2142, in a wash of steady sarcasm, of how a “Victorian writer speaks of literature as opening a ‘serene and luminous region of truth where all may meet and expatiate in common’, above ‘the smoke and stir, the din and turmoil of man’s lower life of care and business and debate”. The phrase “moral riches of bourgeoisie civilization” elicited a similar reaction. Literature, in a way, acts in the same way as a magician’s sleight of hand might.

At the bottom of 2143, he drives the point home, elucidating that “the actually impoverished experience of the mass of people can be supplemented by literature”; this blunt point on his Marxist-y thesis of how “English” education—not philology or the Classic canon of Oxbridge’s traditions—was created by Victorian aristocracy to subtly contain a middle and working class and mold its worldview, beckoning it into the hall of higher mental meditation in hopes of quieting the hellish buzzing of a life lived within alienated labor.

My conclusion isn’t so serious and nothing in my epistemological foundation crumbles to shards—I’m not so devoted to this poststructuralist project that I can’t contain myself—but this remains humorous; as to think that this sweet subject (“English Literature”), one I just can’t stop enrolling in, was introduced to the academic grounds as a way of wicking our understanding away from the thing and closer to whatever else suits the commandeering cause of the ruling powers; Eagleton fortunately calls it like it is: “the survival of private property”.

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syllabus complete

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

As I’m sure you’ve noticed, we professors tend to tweak the syllabus as we go, so nothing is in stone here, but the syllabus is more or less set.  Also note that there are student posts below.  These are the work of prior students, and I’ve decided to keep them up in case anyone is interested in what your peers had to say about the readings in the past; they give a good flavor of the course if you’re interested in browsing.

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Glorification of the Traditional Intellectual Mind?

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

I know this is rather old material, but during our discussion about Gramsci, I managed to scrawl down a theory I came up with about the development of attitudes toward traditional intellectuals that I’d like to share (not sure anyone will read it at this point, though).

Just to rehash: In “The Formation of the Intellectuals”, Gramsci breaks down what it means to be an intellectual as well as the two categories of intellectuals and their roles in society. Gramsci theorizes that the two “types” of intellectuals are traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals are the easiest to pinpoint, in that they tend to be the only people we consider “real” intellectuals on a superficial level (that is, before reading Gramsci). According to Gramsci, these traditional intellectuals are scientists, philosophers, educators, doctors, clergymen, judges, etc. Traditional intellectuals are those who work primarily with their minds and regard themselves as autonomous and above the dominant social group (the “ignorant masses”, I guess one could say). They’re also considered transhistorical, in that they persist in spite of social upheaval. The less obvious of the two types of intellectuals are what Gramsci calls the organic intellectuals. These intellectuals are bound to class and have a direct relationship to production, and are thus embedded in the work structure. As Gramsci states, “These organic intellectuals would come from within the working class and stay within the working class working towards a counter-hegemony by actively engaging and leading in social relations”. They can be the intellectuals who work with their hands, like manual labourers or mechanics, but can also include union leaders amongst others who could be mistaken for traditional intellectuals. Although some may mistake organic intellectuals as being lowly or subservient to traditional intellectuals, they are often counter-hegemonic and responsible for social change.

What I really want to talk about in this blog post is a tangent I went on during the class discussion on this text. When we were discussing traditional intellectuals, I had this thought about exactly why traditional intellectuals are seen as more intellectual than organic intellectuals or those intellectuals who are more directly physically involved in their work (but all intellectual activity requires some physical interaction, really). I scrawled the following on the subject:

“-Viewed higher– work more w/ mind (intellect) as opposed to the physical realm, which is associated with lowliness + servitude. What is traditionally seen as the intellectual realm transcends the physical, moving toward the spiritual. (Is this at all rooted in religion, and the denial of the body and glorification of the mental/spiritual? [think purity, denial of the physical body and “lusts of the flesh”]).

“Resistance/denial of physicality/physical desires (almost moving toward asceticism), elevation of the intellectual and therefore the intangible (thoughts). Is this why society and ideology instructs us to value those who primarily work with their minds (traditional intellectuals) over those who work with their hands?”

I’d like to map this out more clearly eventually, probably over the break, but I think I might be onto something…

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Read more about ..

Posted by Jeff Allred (he/him/his) on

This image is important:

Image

As an intersectional feminist who is well aware of the sexual objectification of women in media, Mulvey didn’t have much to say that I haven’t surmised before; nevertheless, it’s always great to see academic work on the subject, and even better to be assigned such a reading, as I’m aware most people are deeply lacking in a feminist education. I truly think courses on feminism should be mandatory at the college level if not high school level. But I digress…

So, in her essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, Laura Mulvey deconstructs the ways in which film thrives on the sexual objectification of women. Clearly drenched in psychoanalytical theory, Mulvey writes that the (cis-)women’s biological “lack” (the absence of a penis) instills fear in males– to be specific, castration anxiety. Men feel threatened by women’s lack of a penis, which symbolizes male power, and subsequently feel fit to degrade and subjugate women due to that perceived threat. It seems to me that by this theory, the root of patriarchy is this castration anxiety, although it’s hard to say who decided that presence as opposed to lack is indicative of power. Perhaps lack (the vagina) is analogous to death, and presence (the penis) is analogous to life. But men aren’t the ones giving birth anyway.

Mulvey asserts that this phenomenon is pervasive in cinema (particularly classic Hollywood films, which I lament as a TCM fan) as well, which isn’t at all surprising as the field is dominated by men. Mulvey came up with three looks in cinema that serve to objectify women in a sexual manner in other to facilitate male pleasure and position the male viewer as the “hero”. The first look is from the perspective of the dominant male in the film looking at the female character who he sexualizes and objectifies (he perceives her as a sexual object because men are always entitled to women’s bodies, naturally). The second look  is from the perspective of the audience, and the third look is a conglomerate of the first and second looks, in which the male audience makes the female character his personal sex object through his voyeurism and absurd self-identification with the male hero in the film.

Basically, none of this is unexpected to me. When I do go to the movies on rare occasion, I go anticipating being offended, although I try to take a step back and analyze what I’m viewing and still allow myself to enjoy the parts of it that aren’t so dehumanizing. Something else I’ve been mulling over is how cinema has changed for women since the classic Hollywood era. Although most women in films from the 20s-50s (and I guess the first half of the 60s counts too?) do match up to what is expected of a woman (that is, traditional femininity), there wasn’t nearly as much graphic sexual content (like why is that even necessary and how does that ever further a plot, please go away with your sad teenage fantasies thank you). Women were implicitly, but not explicitly, sexual objects of male desire. I think it can be argued that in that regard, maybe women had it better in classic Hollywood films, but then again it can also be argued that the sexual liberty of modern and contemporary films promote the idea that women are sexual beings, do like sex, and shouldn’t be ashamed of it.

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